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# Help # Output a help topic. # # To Do: Output the obscured text within a class instantiation. So rather than # just outputting obscured text, output 'Hidden('obscured-text'). Also, accept # obscured text within its class and try to decode it using the class name, so # if GPG("ciphertext") then it will use GPG to decode it even if user does not # provide the encoding. # # Also implement script class that uses a personal password. Call this Encrypt # or PersonalEncrypt.
# License {{{1 # Copyright (C) 2016 Kenneth S. Kundert # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under # the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software # Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later # version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT # ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more # details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with # this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
# Imports {{{1 from .command import Command from .config import get_setting from .obscure import Obscure from .utilities import pager, two_columns from inform import error, output from textwrap import dedent
# HelpMessage base class {{{1 class HelpMessage(object): # get_name() {{{2 @classmethod def get_name(cls): try: return cls.name.lower() except AttributeError: # consider converting lower to upper case transitions in __name__ to # dashes. return cls.__name__.lower()
# topics {{{2 @classmethod def topics(cls): for sub in cls.__subclasses__(): yield sub
# show {{{2 @classmethod def show(cls, name=None): if name: command = Command.find(name) if command: return pager(command.help()) for topic in cls.topics(): if name == topic.get_name(): return pager(topic.help()) error('topic not found.', culprit=name) else: cls.help()
# summarize {{{2 @classmethod def summarize(cls, width=16): summaries = [] for topic in sorted(cls.topics(), key=lambda topic: topic.get_name()): summaries.append(two_columns(topic.get_name(), topic.DESCRIPTION)) return '\n'.join(summaries)
# help {{{2 @classmethod def help(cls): output('Available commands:') output(Command.summarize())
output('\nAvailable topics:') output(cls.summarize())
# Abraxas class {{{1 class Abraxas(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "exporting accounts from Abraxas"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" Avendesora generalizes and replaces Abraxas, its predecessor. To transition from Abraxas to Avendesora, you will first need to upgrade Abraxas to version 1.8 or higher (use 'abraxas -v' to determine version). Then run:
abraxas --export
It will create a collection of Avendesora accounts files in ~/.config/abraxas/avendesora. You need to manually add these files to your list of accounts files in Avendesora. Say one such file in created: ~/.config/abraxas/avendesora/accounts.gpg. This could be added to Avendesora as follows:
1. create a symbolic link from ~/.config/avendesora/abraxas_accounts.gpg to ~/.config/abraxas/avendesora/accounts.gpg:
cd ~/.config/avendesora ln -s ../abraxas/avendesora/accounts.gpg abraxas_accounts.gpg
2. add abraxas_accounts.gpg to account_files list in .accounts_files.
Now all of the Abraxas accounts contained in abraxas_accounts.gpg should be available though Avendesora and the various features of the account should operate as expected. However, secrets in accounts exported by Abraxas are no longer generated secrets. Instead, the actual secrets are placed in a hidden form in the exported accounts files.
If you would like to enhance the imported accounts to take advantage of the new features of Avendesora, it is recommended that you do not manually modify the imported files. Instead, copy the account information to one of your own account files before modifying it. To avoid conflict, you must then delete the account from the imported file. To do so, create ~/.config/abraxas/do-not-export if it does not exist, then add the account name to this file, and reexport your accounts from Abraxas. """).strip() return text
# Accounts class {{{1 class Accounts(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "describing an account"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" Account information is stored in account files. The list of account files is given in ~/.config/avendesora/.accounts_files. New account files are created using 'avendesora new', but to delete an accounts file, you must remove it from .accounts_files. Once an accounts file exists, you may add accounts to it using 'account add'. Use the -f option to specify which file is to contain the new account.
An account is basically a collection of attributes organized as a subclass of the Python Account class. For example:
class NewYorkTimes(Account): aliases = 'nyt' username = 'derrickAsh' email = 'derrickAsh@gmail.com' passcode = PasswordRecipe('12 2u 2d 2s') discovery = RecognizeURL( 'https://myaccount.nytimes.com', script='{email}{tab}{passcode}{return}' )
Most of the field values can be retrieved simply by asking for them. For example,
> avendesora value newyorktimes username username: derrickAsh
In general, values can be strings, arrays, dictionaries, and special Advendesora classes. For example, you could have an array of security questions:
questions = [ Question("What is your mother's maiden name?"), Question("What city were you born?"), Question("What is first pet's name?"), ]
Then you can request the answer to a particular question using its index:
> avendesora value newyorktimes questions.0 questions.0 (What is your mother's maiden name?): portrayal tentacle fanlight
'questions' is the default array field, so you could have shortened your request by using '0' rather than 'questions.0'. You might be thinking, hey, that is not my mother's maiden name. That is because Question is a 'generated secret'. It produces a completely arbitrary answer that is impossible to predict. Thus, even family members cannot know the answers to your security questions.
A dictionary is often used to hold account numbers:
accounts = [ 'checking': '1234-56-7890', 'savings': '0123-45-6789', ]
You then access its values using:
> avendesora value newyorktimes accounts.checking accounts.checking: 1234-56-7890
You might consider your account numbers as sensitive information. In this case you can hide them with:
accounts = [ 'checking': Hidden('MTIzNC01Ni03ODkw'), 'savings': Hidden('MDEyMy00NS02Nzg5'), ]
The values are now hidden, but not encrypted. They are simply encoded with base64. Any knowledgable person with the encoded value can decode it back to its original value. Using Hidden makes it harder to recognize and remember the value given only a quick over-the-shoulder glance. It also marks the value as sensitive, so it will only be displayed for a minute. You generate the encoded value using 'avendesora conceal'.
Any value that is an instance of the Secret class (Password, Passphrase, ...) or the Obscure class (Hidden, GPG, ...) are considered sensitive. They are given out only in a controlled manner. For example, running 'avendesora values' displays all fields, but the values that are sensitive are replaced by instructions on how to view them. They can only be viewed individually:
> avendesora values newyorktimes names: newyorktimes, nyt email: derrickAsh@gmail.com passcode: <reveal with 'avendesora value newyorktimes passcode'> username: derrickAsh
The 'aliases' and 'discovery' fields are not shown because they are considered tool fields. Other tool fields include 'NAME', 'default', 'master', 'browser', and 'default_url'. For more information on discovery, run 'avendesora help discovery'. 'default' is the name of the default field, which is the field you get if you do not request a particular field. Its value defaults to 'passcode' but it can be set to any account attribute name or it can be a script (see 'avendesora help scripts'). 'browser' is the default browser to use when opening the account, run 'avendesora help browse' to see a list of available browsers.
The value of passcode is considered sensitive because it is an instance of PasswordRecipe, which is a subclass of Secret. If we wish to see the passcode, use:
> avendesora value nyt passcode: TZuk8:u7qY8%
This value will be displayed for a minute and then hidden. If you would like to hide it early, simply type Ctrl-C.
Use of Avendesora classes (Secret or Obscure) is confined to the top two levels of account attributes, meaning that they can be the value of the top-level attributes, or the top-level attributes may be arrays or dictionaries that contain objects of these classes, but it can go no further.
For information on how to generate secrets, run 'avendesora help secrets'. For information on how to conceal or encrypt values, run 'avendesora help obscure'. """).strip() return text
# Discovery class {{{1 class Discovery(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "account discovery"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" If you do not give an account to 'avendesora value', Avendesora will try to determine the account by simply asking each account. An account can look at the window title, the user name, the host name, the working directory, and the environment variables to determine if it is suitable. If so, it nominates itself. If there is only one account nominated, that account is used. If there are multiple nominees, then a small window pops up allowing you to choose which account you wish to use.
To configure an account to trigger when a particular window title is seen, use:
discovery = RecognizeTitle( 'Chase Online *', script='{username}{tab}{passcode}{return}' )
The title is a glob string, meaning that '*' matches any combination of characters. The script describes what Avendesora should output when their is a match. In this case it outputs the username field, then a tab, then the passcode field, then a return (see 'avendesora help scripts').
Matching window titles can be fragile, especially for websites because the titles can vary quite a bit across the site and over time. To accommodate this variation, you can give multiple glob patterns:
discovery = RecognizeTitle( 'CHASE Bank*', 'Chase Online*', script='{username}{tab}{passcode}{return}' )
If you use Firefox, you can install the 'Add URL to Window Title' extension. Doing so adds the website URL to the Firefox window title, which can make account discovery more robust. In this case you can use:
discovery = RecognizeURL( 'https://chaseonline.chase.com', 'https://www.chase.com', script='{username}{tab}{passcode}{return}' )
When giving the URL, anything specified must match and globbing is not supported. If you give a partial path, by default Avendesora will match up to what you have given, but you can require an exact match of the entire path by specifying exact_path=True to RecognizeURL. If you do not give the protocol, https is assumed.
The following recognizers are available:
RecognizeAll(<recognizer>..., [script=<script>]) RecognizeAny(<recognizer>..., [script=<script>]) RecognizeTitle(<title>..., [script=<script>]) RecognizeURL(<title>..., [script=<script>, [name=<name>]], [exact_path=<bool>]) RecognizeHost(<host>..., [script=<script>]) RecognizeUser(<user>..., [script=<script>]) RecognizeCWD(<cwd>..., [script=<script>]) RecognizeEnvVar(<name>, <value>, [script=<script>])
RecognizeAll() and RecognizeAny() can be used to combine several recognizers. For example:
discovery = RecognizeAll( RecognizeTitle('sudo *'), RecognizeUser('hhyde'), script='{passcode}{return}' )
To make secret discovery easier and more robust it is helpful to add a plugin to your web browser to make its title more informative. For Firefox, the best plugin to use is AddURLToWindowTitle. For Chrome it is URLinTitle. It is recommended that you install the appropriate one into your browser. For AddURLToWindowTitle, set the following options:
show full URL = yes separator string = '-' show field attributes = no
For URLinTitle, set:
tab title format = '{title} - {protocol}://{hostname}{port}/{path}'
When account discovery fails it can be difficult to determine what is going wrong. When this occurs, you should first examine the log file. It should show you the window title and the recognized title components. You should first assure the title is as expected. If Add URL to Window Title generated the title, then the various title components should also be shown. Then run Avendesora as follows:
avendesora value --verbose --title '<title>'
The title should be copied from the log file. The verbose option causes the result of each test to be included in the log file, so you can determine which recognizer is failing to trigger.
If the recognizers are given in an array, all are tried. For example:
discovery = [ RecognizeURL( 'http://www.querty-forum.org', script='admin{tab}{passcode}{return}', name='admin', ), RecognizeURL( 'http://www.querty-forum.org', script='thecaretaker{tab}{passcode}{return}', name='thecaretaker', ), ]
In this case, both recognizers recognize the same URL, thus they will both be offered for this site. But each has a different script. The name allows the user to distinguish the available choices. """).strip() return text
# Entropy class {{{1 class Entropy(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "how much entropy is enough?"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" A 4 word Avendesora password provides 53 bits of entropy, which seems like a lot, but NIST is recommending 80 bits for your most secure passwords. So, how much is actually required. It is worth exploring this question. Entropy is a measure of how hard the password is to guess. Specifically, it is the base two logarithm of the likelihood of guessing the password in a single guess. Every increase by one in the entropy represents a doubling in the difficulty of guessing your password. The actual entropy is hard to pin down, so generally we talk about the minimum entropy, which is the likelihood of an adversary guessing the password if he or she knows everything about the scheme used to generate the password but does not know the password itself. So in this case the minimum entropy is the likelihood of guessing the password if it is known that we are using 4 space separated words as our pass phrase. This is very easy to compute. There are roughly 10,000 words in our dictionary, so if there was only one word in our pass phrase, the chance of guessing it would be one in 10,000 or 13 bits of entropy. If we used a two word pass phrase the chance of guessing it in a single guess is one in 10,000*10,000 or one in 100,000,000 or 26 bits of entropy.
The probability of guessing our pass phrase in one guess is not our primary concern. Really what we need to worry about is given a determined attack, how long would it take to guess the password. To calculate that, we need to know how fast our adversary could try guesses. If they are trying guesses by typing them in by hand, their rate is so low, say one every 10 seconds, that even a one word pass phrase may be enough to deter them. Alternatively, they may have a script that automatically tries pass phrases through a login interface. Again, generally the rate is relatively slow. Perhaps at most the can get is 1000 tries per second. In this case they would be able to guess a one word pass phrase in 10 seconds and a two word pass phrase in a day, but a 4 word pass phrase would require 300,000 years to guess in this way.
The next important thing to think about is how your password is stored by the machine or service you are logging into. The worst case situation is if they save the passwords in plain text. In this case if someone were able to break in to the machine or service, they could steal the passwords. Saving passwords in plain text is an extremely poor practice that was surprisingly common, but is becoming less common as companies start to realize their liability when their password files get stolen. Instead, they are moving to saving passwords as hashes. A hash is a transformation that is very difficult to reverse, meaning that if you have the password it is easy to compute its hash, but given the hash it is extremely difficult to compute the original password. Thus, they save the hashes (the transformed passwords) rather than the passwords. When you log in and provide your password, it is transformed with the hash and the result is compared against the saved hash. If they are the same, you are allowed in. In that way, your password is no longer available to thieves that break in. However, they can still steal the file of hashed passwords, which is not as good as getting the plain text passwords, but it is still valuable because it allows thieves to greatly increase the rate that they can try passwords. If a poor hash was used to hash the passwords, then passwords can be tried at a very high rate. For example, it was recently reported that password crackers were able to try 8 billion passwords per second when passwords were hashed with the MD5 algorithm. This would allow a 4 word pass phrase to be broken in 14 days, whereas a 6 word password would still require 4,000,000 years to break. The rate for the more computational intensive sha512 hash was only 2,000 passwords per second. In this case, a 4 word pass phrase would require 160,000 years to break.
In most cases you have no control over how your passwords are stored on the machines or services that you log into. Your best defense against the notoriously poor security practices of most sites is to always use a unique password for sites where you are not in control of the secrets. For example, you might consider using the same pass phrase for you login password and the pass phrase for an ssh key on a machine that you administer, but never use the same password for two different websites unless you do not care if the content of those sites become public.
So, if we return to the question of how much entropy is enough, you can say that for important passwords where you are in control of the password database and it is extremely unlikely to get stolen, then four randomly chosen words from a reasonably large dictionary is plenty. If what the pass phrase is trying to protect is very valuable and you do not control the password database (ex., your brokerage account) you might want to follow the NIST recommendation and use 6 words to get 80 bits of entropy. If you are typing passwords on your work machine, many of which employ keyloggers to record your every keystroke, then no amount of entropy will protect you from anyone that has or gains access to the output of the keylogger. In this case, you should consider things like one-time passwords or two-factor authentication. Or better yet, only access sensitive accounts from your home machine and not from any machine that you do not control. """).strip() return text
# Misdirection class {{{1 class Misdirection(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "misdirection in secrets generation"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" One way to avoid being compelled to disclose a secret is to disavow any knowledge of the secret. However, the presence of an account in Avendesora that pertains to that secret undercuts this argument. This is the purpose of stealth accounts. They allow you to generate secrets for accounts for which Avendesora has no stored information. In this case Avendesora asks you for the minimal amount of information that it needs to generate the secret. However in some cases, the amount of information that must be retained is simply too much to keep in your head. In that case another approach, referred to as secret misdirection, can be used.
With secret misdirection, you do not disavow any knowledge of the secret, instead you say your knowledge is out of date. So you would say something like "I changed the password and then forgot it", or "The account is closed". To support this ruse, you must use the --seed (or -S) option to 'avendsora value' when generating your secret (secrets misdirection only works with generated passwords, not stored passwords). This causes Avendesora to ask you for an additional seed at the time you request the secret. If you do not use --seed or you do and give the wrong seed, you will get a different value for your secret. In effect, using --seed when generating the original value of the secret causes Avendesora to generate the wrong secret by default, allowing you to say "See, I told you it would not work". But when you want it to work, you just interactively provide the correct seed.
You would typically only use misdirection for secrets you are worried about being compelled to disclose. So it behooves you to use an unpredictable additional seed for these secrets to reduce the chance someone could guess it.
Be aware that when you employ misdirection on a secret, the value of the secret stored in in the archive will not be the true value, it will instead be the misdirected value. """).strip() return text
# Overview class {{{1 class Overview(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "overview of Avendesora"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" Avendesora is password utility that can store your account information and generate account passwords and produce them from the command line. It can also be configured to autotype your username and password into the current window so that you can log in with a simple keystroke.
Avendesora is capable of generating passwords (character-based passcodes) or pass phrases (word-based passcodes). Pass phrases are generally preferred if you have a choice, but many websites will not take them. The benefit of pass phrases is that they are relatively easy to remember and type, and they are very secure. The pass phrases generated by Avendesora generally consist of four words, each word is drawn from a dictionary of 10,000 words. Thus, even if a bad guy knew that four lower case words were being used for your pass phrase, there are still 10,000,000,000,000,000 possible combinations for him to try (this represents a minimum entropy of 53 bits). Using six words results in 80 bits of entropy, which meets the threshold recommended by NIST for the most secure pass phrases. For more on this, see 'avendesora help entropy' below.
For another perspective on the attractiveness of pass phrases, see http://xkcd.com/936/.
Unlike password vaults, Avendesora produces a highly unpredictable password from a master password and the name of the account for which the password is to be used. The process is completely repeatable. If you give the same master password and account name, you will get the same password. As such, the passwords do not have to be saved; instead they are regenerated on the fly.
As a password generator, Avendesora provides three important advantages over conventional password vaults. First, it allows groups of people to share access to accounts without having to securely share each password. Instead, one member of the group creates a master password that is securely shared with the group once. From then on any member of the group can create a new account, share the name of the account, and all members will know the password needed to access the account. The second advantage is that it opens up the possibility of using high-quality passwords for stealth accounts, which are accounts where you remember the name of the account but do not store any information about even the existence of the account on your computer. With Avendesora, you only need to remember the name of the account and it will regenerate the password for you. This is perfect for your TrueCrypt hidden volume password. Finally, by securely storing a small amount of information, perhaps on a piece of paper in your safe-deposit box, you can often recover most if not all of your passwords even if you somehow lose your accounts file. You can even recover passwords that were created after you created your backup. This is because Avendesora combines the master password with some easily reconstructed information, such as the account name, to create the password. If you save the master password, the rest should be recoverable.
To use it, one creates a file that contains information about each of his or her non-stealth accounts. Among that information would be information that controls how the passwords are generated. This file is generally not encrypted, though you can encrypt it if you like). Another file is created that contains one or more master passwords. This file is always GPG encrypted.
The intent is for these files to not include the passwords for your accounts. Rather, the passwords are regenerated when needed from the account information and from the master password. This makes it easy to share passwords with others without having to pass the passwords back and forth. It is only necessary to create a shared master password in advance. Then new passwords can be created on the fly by either party. """).strip() return text
# Questions class {{{1 class Questions(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "security questions"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" Security questions are form of security theater imposed upon you by many websites. The claim is that these questions increase the security of your account. In fact they often do the opposite by creating additional avenues of access to your account. Their real purpose is to allow you to regain access to your account in case you lose your password. If you are careful, this is not needed (you do back up your Avendesora accounts, right?). In this case it is better to randomly generate your answers.
Security questions are handled by adding something like the following to your account:
questions = [ Question('oldest aunt'), Question('title of first job'), Question('oldest uncle'), Question('savings goal'), Question('childhood vacation spot'), ]
The string identifying the question does not need to contain the question verbatim, a abbreviated version is sufficient as long as it allows you to distinguish the question. The questions are given as an array, and so are accessed with an index that starts at 0. Thus, to get the answer to who is your 'oldest aunt', you would use:
> avendesora value <accountname> 0 questions.0 (oldest aunt): ampere reimburse duster
You can get a list of your questions so you can identify which index to use with:
> avenedesora values <accountname> ... questions: 0: oldest aunt <reveal with 'avendesora value <accountname> questions.0'> 1: title of first job <reveal with 'avendesora value <accountname> questions.1'> 2: oldest uncle <reveal with 'avendesora value <accountname> questions.2'> 3: savings goal <reveal with 'avendesora value <accountname> questions.3'> 4: childhood vacation spot <reveal with 'avendesora value <accountname> questions.4'> ...
By default, Avendesora generates a response that consists of 3 random words. This makes it easy to read to a person over the phone if asked to confirm your identity. Occasionally you will not be able to enter your own answer, but must choose one that is offered to you. In this case, you can specify the answer as part of the question:
questions = [ Question('favorite fruit', answer='grapes'), Question('first major city visited', answer='paris'), Question('favorite subject', answer='history'), ]
When giving the answers you may want to conceal them to protect them from casual observation.
Be aware that the question is used as a seed when generating the answer, so if you change the question in any way it changes the answer. """).strip() return text
# Scripts class {{{1 class Scripts(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "scripts"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" You can use simple scripts for controlling the output. Scripts take the form of text strings with embedded attributes. For example:
'username: {username}, password: {passcode}'
This string is printed as is except that the attributes are replaced by their value from the chosen account. For example, this script might produce:
username: jman, password: R7ibHyPjWtG2
There are several situations where scripts can be used. You can give a script rather than a field when running the value command:
> avendesora value scc 'username: {username}, password: {passcode}' username: jman, password: R7ibHyPjWtG2
You can also create an account where default is given as a script:
class SCC(Acount): aliases = 'scc' username = 'jman' password = Password() default = 'username: {username}, password: {passcode}'
Then you can access the script by simply not providing a field.
> avendesora value scc username: jman, password: R7ibHyPjWtG2
Finally, you pass a script to the account discovery recognizers. They specify the action that should be taken when particular recognizer triggers. For example, this recognizer could be used to recognize Gmail:
discovery = [ RecognizeURL( 'https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin', script='{username}{return}{sleep 1.5}{passcode}{return}' ), RecognizeURL( 'https://accounts.google.com/signin/challenge', script='{questions.0}{return}' ), ]
Besides the account attributes, you can use several other special attributes including: {tab}, {return}, and {sleep N}. {tab} is replaced by a tab character, {return} is replaced by a carriage return character, and {sleep N} causes a pause of N seconds. The sleep function is only active when autotyping after account discovery. """).strip() return text
# Stealth class {{{1 class Stealth(HelpMessage): DESCRIPTION = "stealth secrets"
@staticmethod def help(): text = dedent(""" Normally Avendesora uses information from an account that is contained in an account file to generate the secrets for that account. In some cases, the presence of the account itself, even though it is contained within an encrypted file can be problematic. The mere presence of an encrypted file may result in you being compelled to open it. For the most damaging secrets, it is best if there is no evidence that the secret exists at all. This is the purpose of stealth accounts. (Misdirection is an alternative to stealth accounts; see 'avendesora help misdirection').
Generally one uses the predefined stealth accounts, which all have names that are descriptive of the form of the secret they generate, for example Word6 generates a 6-word pass phrase. The predefined accounts are kept in ~/.config/avendesora/stealth_accounts.
Stealth accounts are subclasses of the StealthAccount class. These accounts differ from normal accounts in that they do not contribute the account name to the secrets generators for use as a seed. Instead, the user is requested to provide the account name every time the secret is generated. The secret depends strongly on this account name, so it is essential you give precisely the same name each time. The term 'account name' is being use here, but you can enter any text you like. Best to make this text very difficult to guess if you are concerned about being compelled to disclose your GPG keys.
The secret generator will combine the account name with the master password before generating the secret. This allows you to use simple predictable account names and still get an unpredictable secret. The master password used is taken from master_password in the file that contains the stealth account if it exists, or the users key if it does not. By default the stealth accounts file does not contain a master password, which makes it difficult to share stealth accounts. You can create additional stealth account files that do contain master passwords that you can share with your associates. """).strip() return text
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